Speech by Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Leader of the House of Commons, to the Hansard Society, London, July 11, 2006

This proposal – now actively being considered by the official opposition - is one of many encountered in politics as in life which sound superficially attractive, and simple but which, on any closer examination, turn out to be wholly unjustified, incredibly complex, confusing in practice, and profoundly damaging.

The justification for a two-tier system of MPs is that as English MPs cannot vote on Scottish matters which are the responsibility of the Scottish Parliament then neither should Scottish MPs be allowed to vote on similar matters relating to England. It’s the so-called “ins and outs” solution to Tam Dalyell’s “West Lothian question”.

But this question is one whose basic premise is fundamentally flawed. Yes, it is correct that at any one time whilst the Scotland Act is in force, some legislative matters which for England (and to some degree Wales) would be dealt with in the Westminster Parliament, are for Scotland to deal with in the Scottish Parliament. But the only legal reason why the Scottish Parliament has this power is because the Westminster Parliament has delegated – devolved – its powers over these domestic areas to the Scottish Parliament. Power devolved is not power ceded – quite the reverse. The Scotland Act 1998 only came into force after a referendum in Scotland, and it would in my view be both unwise and a breach of faith with the Scottish people for any significant changes in the Scotland Act to be made without the consular of the Scottish people in a further referendum. But, legally, the Scotland Act is no different from any other Act of Parliament. It is not specially entrenched law. No Parliament can bind its successor. So in theory, the majority of English MPs could – however unlikely it might be – change or repeal the Scotland Act.

If the four nations of the union were of equal population size then establishing a federal structure - if that was what was desired - would be relatively straightforward. But the UK is not like that. England is plainly very much larger than the other three nations in terms of Commons seats, population and economic strength – with 82% of the seats, 84% of the population and 86% of UK’s GDP.

My own region of England – the North West – has an almost identical population to Scotland and Northern Ireland combined. It’s not just that the Westminster Parliament is the legal source of the power devolved to Scotland. How the Scottish Parliament and Executive can in practice use that power depends – day by day, week by week – on a crucial power over Scotland retained by Westminster – over money, over what Scotland receives by way of block grant from the Exchequer.

Though it has a marginal power to do so, the Scottish Parliament today raises no taxation of its own. All its revenue comes from UK taxation; Its share is dependent not on anything entrenched but on a formula – in this case Barnett – which critically connects Scottish spending to English spending.

Demand on the public purse comes from many sources, not least from legislation relating to public services. Acts of Parliament whose “territorial extent” might relate to England only can in fact have profound implications for other parts of the UK, especially if they pre-empt resources to those other parts.

No taxation without representation in every area of government seems to me to be a fundamental maxim of any democracy.

The cry of those asking and answering the so-called West Lothian question is also of those who demand symmetry in our constitutional arrangements. But our constitutional arrangements work precisely because they are, at any one point, asymmetrical, as they need to be to balance out England’s overwhelming size. Nor are we alone in this. Classically federal systems like the US are, on closer examination, asymmetrical. In the US Senate the smallest 26 states, representing just 18% of the population can command a majority over the other states, with (82%) of the population. This is no more “unfair” than our system is. For what good constitutional arrangements seek to do is to balance competing interests and forces.

The first objection therefore, to the “ins and outs” two-tiered House of Commons is that its premise is flawed. The second objection is that the “ins and outs” policy would be so complex and confusing as to be almost unworkable in practice.

“Clearly you can separate out “bits of Bills” [sic] distinguishing between the English “bits” and the UK “bits”, claimed Lord Baker when presenting his “ins and outs” Bill to the Lords in February. Really?

This process would be so simple and clear that in the very next sentence of his speech Lord Baker then makes the revealing concession to the very complexity which he has just denied by saying “The Speaker can take advice from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council” – the Law Lords [Lords Hansard 10/02/06 col. 902]. So there we are then. As a Bill is proceeding through its Committee stage or Report stage, a crucial issue arises as to whether one of its “bits” is to be certified English or UK wide. The territorial extent of the clause – or part of a clause – cannot be conclusive, as so many “England only” decisions have plain implications for Scotland as well. So a ruling from the Speaker is called for.

The stakes could be very high. The Speaker then does what Lord Baker proposes, and sends for the Judicial Committee – the Law Lord – to give advice. The Law Lords say they need to hear the arguments from each side before reaching a view. They are, after all, Britain’s superior court. So there is a hearing with considerable delay, on just one clause. Just to spell out this process is to highlight its absurdity.

Or imagine if each “bit” of a Bill has been certified as English or UK. There’s an English “bit”. Then an English MP proposes extending this “bit” to Scotland in some way. Divisions would be a farce.

This chaos and confusion would be replicated within government. “The Baker proposals would destroy the principle of collective responsibility, according to which government must stand or fall as a whole, commanding a majority on all the issues that come before Parliament, not just a selection. It is difficult to see how Britain could be effectively governed in such circumstances”

How could a Cabinet make coherent decisions when it could not know from day to day whether there was a prospect of a legislative proposal passing or not? And Alan Duncan MP, Shadow Trade Secretary, was not wrong in claiming that the “ins and outs” solution would make it difficult for any MP representing a Scottish constituency to be Prime Minister.

This leads me to my third and most important point, which is that this approach would start to dissolve the glue which binds our Union, and over time would lead to the break-up of the United Kingdom itself.

Let us be clear. The United Kingdom – Great Britain and Northern Ireland – is a union which works to the equal benefit of all four nations of the union. The whole is greater than the sum of the parts. But the other three nations have not done England a favour by joining the union. Historically, England called the shots to achieve a union because the union was seen as a way, amongst others things, of amplifying England’s power worldwide. And the reverse would certainly be true. A broken-up United Kingdom would not be in the interests of Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, but especially not England. Our voting power in the European Union would diminish. We’d slip down in the world league GDP tables. Our case for staying in the G8 would diminish and there could easily be an assault on our permanent seat in the UN Security Council. No wonder that Philip Stephens of the Financial Times described Mr Cameron’s proposals as a “reckless preference for political gimmickry”. Reckless they are. Unworkable and irresponsible too.