Scottish Referendum

At the end of July Prof Robert Hazell wrote an article in the Guardian claiming that Scottish secession would require two referendums, it was a piece later described as "panicky" by Christopher Harvey.

Over at Our Kingdom Tom Griffin surmised the four major obstacles that Hazell believes the SNP must overcome to achieve independence.

1. Winning a vote in the Scottish Parliament authorising a referendum.
2. Winning a referendum to authorise independence negotiations.
3. Negotiating terms with the British Government and with the European Union.
4. Winning a second referendum on the agreed terms.

In a speech to the Australian Parliament earlier this year Bernard Crick highlighted the UK Government's guarantee to Ulster Unionists:

The key constitutional doctrine of the United Kingdom is still widely believed to be the sovereignty of Parliament. The trouble with that is, as some super patriots are well aware, Parliament can abrogate its own sovereignty in such a way that it is politically highly unlikely that it could ever reclaim it. That is clear in the case of the Treaty of Rome and consequent legislation, but also listen to this from the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 – the famous “guarantee” to the Ulster unionists:

It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland remains part of Her Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom, and it is hereby affirmed that in no event will Northern Ireland or any part of it cease to be part of Her Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll held for the purpose of this section and in accordance to Schedule 1 of this Act.

What a guarantee! Northern Ireland is not constitutionally an integral and perpetual part of the United Kingdom, but a conditional one. And the British-Irish Intergovernmental Agreement of November 1985 pledged both governments to the establishment of a United Ireland if the consent of a majority in the North was forthcoming. But British governments of both parties, authors of these pragmatic and essential move in resolving the Irish question, see no connection with the Scottish question. Perhaps this is because the Scots are not thought likely to proceed through violence.

If Northern Ireland's membership of the United Kingdom is conditional, then so too must be the membership of Scotland, and in theory England and Wales. So once the principle of departure is consented to in a referendum there is precious little that can be done to overturn that decision.

Hazell disagrees:

the British government is entitled to insist on one final check that independence is the "settled will of the Scottish people". Scots might support the idea of independence in the first referendum but think again when confronted with the actual terms.

If the Scottish people are constitutionally sovereign, and have voted for independence, exactly what entitlement to insist do the United Kingdom Government have? By that stage, of course, the very concept of a United Kingdom Government, or indeed a United Kingdom, would have ceased to exist because out of necessity if nothing else concomitant debates would be occurring in England and Wales. As with any divorce the details would be thrashed out in court.

Comparison between the 1980 and 1995 Quebec referendum questions offer an interesting suggestion as to how Alex Salmond might like to frame the Scottish question. There are of course important differences between the United Kingdom and Canada, namely the fact that when Quebec secedes Canada continues to exist, whereas when Scotland secedes the United Kingdom is extinct. Which raises the question of whether Scotland should be negotiating with England, with whom they entered into a political union, rather than the "United Kingdom" of which they are part. Britology Watch muses upon this question here.