Rifkind's Scottish Assembly plan sounds familiar

For some reason (possibly embarrassment) the Conservatives have removed the Democracy Task Force report into answering the West Lothian Question from the internet. But no matter, I have put it back up and you can read it again and again to your heart's content here.

Listed below the DTF document on the Witanagemot Club Links page is Malcolm Rifkind's response to Ken Clarke, in which he suggests some improvement to Clarke's scheme to better protect England whilst preserving the unity and equality of the House.

Under Clarke’s scheme the English will be denied the affirmative expression of national identity afforded to the Scots; instead UK MPs elected in England will speak for England only negatively - by wrecking UK Government legislation at Committee Stage.

Essentially the scheme rests on the principle of two competing vetos. MPs elected in England (assumed to be acting in the interest of England, even though they are elected on a UK manifesto) can veto the legislation of the UK Government. In return the UK Parliament which selects the Government, and is comprised from MPs returned from all four corners, can at the Third Stage veto any changes that English MPs voted for at the Report Stage. In this way, if the English have transformed the bill to a manner that is acceptable to the English, the government can abort the legislation.

With Rifkind's amendment all MPs would vote exactly as they do under Clarke's scheme, but in addition the Second Stage would require a 'double-majority' (consensual non-vetoes) of both MPs representing English constituencies and the House as a whole.

The original "English votes on English Laws" idea, in which only English MPs vote at Second, Committee, Report and Third Stages has been discarded entirely on the basis "that it could leave the UK executive in a very weak and powerless position on important public service issues of serious political importance". It is not English democracy that is the concern of Rifkind and Clarke. Instead their concern is the preservation of executive power, whilst at the same time attempting to protect England from the power of a UK executive that cannot be assumed or trusted to be acting in English interests.

But what's fascinating is Malcolm Rifkind's intrusion into this debate on the English Question (and yes, the Tories do believe that an answer to the West Lothian Question puts the English Question to bed). In 1975 Mr Rifkind chaired a Scottish Devolution Policy group to determine how the Conservative Party should respond to the Labour Government's White Paper on Scottish devolution. You can read the findings of his group here, courtesy of the Margaret Thatcher Foundation.

To cut a long story short, Rifkind decided to counter demands for a bespoke Scottish Parliament and Executive by recommending a system by which an autonomous Scottish Assembly operated as a chamber within the Westminster system. Rifkind's recommendations on how this would work have some relevance to what is being discussed for England at present.

All purely Scottish legislation should be formally introduced into Parliament and then sent to the Assembly for Second Reading, Committee Stage and Report Stage. The legislation would then return to Westminster which would decide whether to give the Bill its Third Reading and might also have certain powers to amend. Given the full consideration which would have been given by them, it would be hoped that passage through the Lords would involve minimal delay.

If the Assembly declined to give a Second Reading, the Government could either amend to meet the Assembly's objections or withdraw the Bill. In some cases it would be possible to foresee Assembly opposition and consideration could be given to the possibility of United Kingdom legislation that would be solely considered by Parliament. In extreme cases, if the Assembly was being purely and deliberately obstructive, Parliament would, of course, have the legal right to by-pass the Assembly on purely Scottish bills.

Members of the assembly should also have the power to initiate their own legislation. Once it has completed its Stages in the Assembly it would go to Parliament which would have identical powers as with government legislation. The consideration of Scottish legislation in the Assembly should be led by the Secretary of State and his junior Ministers who should have the right to be present and speak during the proceedings of the Assembly. In addition, there should be no objection to the appointment of junior Ministers, including a Minister of State, from the ranks of the Assembly. At present, for example, the Solicitor-General for Scotland is not in either House of Parliament and, accordingly, no new principle would be invoked.

The Assembly should also have the power to summon Scottish Ministers before it or before a Select Committee with power to examine and scrutinise the actions of the Scottish Office.

The above gives you an idea of how an English Grand Committee might operate within the Westminster system. But it also exposes the inadequacy of Rifkind and Clarke's present plans for England. For Scotland Rifkind had in mind a system whereby politicians elected on a Scottish mandate to the 'Assembly' could be appointed junior ministers to the UK Government. Also, on the Second Reading there is no requirement for a 'double-majority', although the UK legislature does remain sovereign. And also, under Rifkind's Scottish plan, Assembly politicians have the right to hold the UK Government to account by hauling ministers before a Scottish Select Committee. And it goes without saying that, of course, the Assembly would have represented Scottish national interests, flying in the face of Westminster if need be; helped by the fact that politicians with a Scottish mandate would have the power to initiate Scottish legislation.

Rifkind goes on to speculate on how Scotland should be financed under his Assembly plan.

With regard to finance, the Secretary of State [for Scotland] should receive a block grant from the Treasury rather than the present practice of determining specific amounts for each of his functions.

And this line of thinking, folks, is how the Barnett Formula came about.

Also worth reading, if only to demonstrate what a conniving bunch politicians are, are the following two devolution memos from Willie Whitelaw.

Shadow Cabinet: Circulated Paper (Whitelaw on devolution)
Shadow Cabinet: Circulated Paper (Willie Whitelaw on Devolution Study Group)

I have little doubt that similar such connivances have been circulated by memo amongst members of the Democracy Task Force and Shadow Cabinet in 2008, and will be again in 2009. These words from Willie Whitelaw in 1975 might just have easily mumbled forth from the gob of Ken Clarke just last week.

I still have personal reservations regarding the political impact of what we might be proposing. There is little doubt that it will come under very severe criticism from the media but our colleagues appear to be prepared to accept this in the interest of our policy being right constitutionally. There is no doubt in my mind that a great deal of work will have to be done in presenting our proposals and in convincing informed opinion that we are on the right lines. At the same time, with the technical assistance which is now available to us, it ought to be possible to put more attractive clothes on the skeleton of the proposals we had at the last election.

This post is inspired by the ever-so-pragmatic Roger Helmer MEP.

For those who are having difficulty following this, I have prepared a handy little guide to Ken Clarke and Malcolm Rifkind’s solution to the West Lothian Question.