John Curtice

Yesterday, the day before Robin Tilbrook appears on the Daily Politics to discuss an English parliament, Prof John Curtice released British Social Attitudes polling which shows support for an English parliament at just 26%. English Democrat supporters might smell a rat. Curtice is the BBC's psephologist of choice and a regular on the Daily Politics. These figures were due for publication in the 29th British Social Attitudes report which is published in full in September. Did Andrew Neil ask his fellow North Briton to bring forward publication to counter recent polling from ippr and British Future, both of which show far greater support for an English dimension to devolution?

Probably not. But the early publication of this data might still be politically motivated. John Curtice would say that it's all about 'impact' but I'm sure it has been released early in order to influence the West Lothian Commission and the debate on Scottish Devo-Max/Plus/Independence.

Anyway, the 2011 figure of 26% in favour of an English parliament is up on 2010's figure of 23% but, as is always the case with British Social Attitudes polling, it is on the low side when compared to other polls.

At the end of the report there is a chapter which attempts to explain why British Social Attitudes finds less English discontent, grievance and nationalism than every other pollster. It's worth a read.

Whilst I accept that British Social Attitudes has methodological consistency on its side I find it almost impossible to believe its findings:

As discussed in the introduction to this report, those who believe that there will be – or has already been – an ‘English backlash’ to devolution in Scotland and Wales argue that this will be reflected in:

• a heightened sense of English identity and a corresponding decline in feelings of Britishness
• increasing resentment in England towards the financial deal other countries get from the union, and
• growing calls for changes to the way England is governed – from removing the voting rights of Scottish MPs in the House of Commons to establishing a separate English parliament.

The latest data from BSA provides little evidence to support the first of these predictions. To the extent that any shift towards a greater sense of English identity did occur, it was both very modest and occurred at around the same time as the establishment of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly in 1999.....

....Although there has been a small increase in demand for an English parliament since around 2008, this largely reflects a fall in demand for English regional assemblies, rather than any shift away from the status quo.

This doesn't, in my opinion, reflect the reality of life lived in England. It seems to me that there is a palpable sense of rising English identity and discontentment with the status quo. It's not necessarily channelled into outright calls for an English parliament, and it's not necessarily anti-British, but the grievance and sense of Englishness is certainly there. I'd be interested to know what John Curtice's gut feelings are. Does he believe his own findings? Has he ever visited an English pub and raised the subject of Scottish independence to see what responses he gets? Anecdotal evidence is no substitute for scientific evidence, but the former does help corroborate the latter.

Does British Social Attitudes face-to-face method of polling reveal a 'Shy English Nationalist Factor' similar to the 'Shy Tory Factor'?

It's the only explanation I can come up with to explain the discrepancy between what British Social Attitudes report and what I perceive with my own eyes and ears.

Mike Knowles comments on the IPPR publication:

Is An English Backlash Emerging?
Reactions to devolution ten years on.
by Professor John Curtice of Strathclyde University.

Synopis:

a. The British Social Attitudes (BSA) findings, despite their disagreement with other equally reputable polling organizations, provide firm reasons to maintain the demand for England to have its own parliament.

b. Some of Professor Curtice's comments on this demand and its supporters are not academically appropriate as they are not supported by or attributable to the findings of the BSA survey. It would appear that they derive from his personal perspective on both the demand for an English Parliament and its supporters. They should therefore be withdrawn, even if that entails the IPPR having to publish an amended version.

I. Summary of the BSA findings with some critical comments on the observations and interpretation thereon by Professor Curtice.

The Curtice paper is his analysis of the responses to the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey conducted by the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) in 2008 and 2009 into 'how public opinion in England has developed following the advent of devolution in Scotland and Wales' (p.3) in 1998. 'During the course of the last decade NatCen has regularly asked people in England about their national identity, how they would like their country to be governed and how they feel about the distribution of public spending' (ibid). In its surveys 2001, 2004 and 2006 'there was little sign' (ibid), they concluded, of any serious discontent among English people with their governmental situation as it stood in 1998. However the survey of 2007 discovered 'a striking new development' (ibid) two in fact: an increase from a quarter to a third of the English people feeling that the Scots were securing more than a fair share of 'the distribution of public expenditure across the UK; and 'tentative signs that support for an English Parliament might be becoming more closely linked to feeling English rather than British 'the first sign perhaps that a form of English nationalism was beginning to merge among the general public' (ibid). Finally, in 2008-9 the BSA visited the topic again, again restricting itself to people living in England.

The outcomes of that survey were as follows:

1 English national identity

since 1992 a 10% increase, from 31% to 41%, of people in England choosing to say they were English rather than British, but no increase since 1999. 'Little sign of any further significant growth (ie since 1999) in English national identity' (p.4).

2. Support for an English Parliament

a. since 1992 a 13% decrease (from 62% to 49%) in support for England being governed as in 1998, ie for all laws governing England to be made by the UK parliament.

b. in 1992 15% support for regional assemblies, which rose to 26% in 2003, the year before the referendum in England's North East 'region' when a regional assembly was rejected by 78% to 22%; now falling back to 15% in 2009;

c. since 1992 an 11% increase (from 18% to 29%) in support of an English Parliament with law-making powers.

d. since 1992 a 20% increase (from 14% to 34%) in support of an English Parliament among English people who choose to say they are English rather than British.

Curtice comments:

a. 'It (the above) shows that now that the idea of elected regional assemblies has fallen off the political agenda, the demand for devolution in England is beginning to coalesce around the potentially more radical and more 'nationalistic' solution of an English Parliament' (p.5).

My response to this is:

It would seem that Curtice without evidence is attributing the increase in support for an EP to the rejection by England's North East of a regional assembly. This could well be the basic error of 'post hoc, ergo propter hoc'. I would think that such a deduction can only logically be made if NatCen had conducted surveys that looked to specify such a connection, particularly in the North East. Curtice might be interpreted to be saying that the demand for an EP is the less favoured alternative among the people polled as the form devolution might take. It might be useful to recall that opposition to an EP has so far been almost endemic among UK academics.

My second comment has to be about the word Curtice uses to describe the sort of solution to English devolution and English Parliament, namely -the inverted commas are his- 'nationalist'. It is an emotive word with which to describe the demand for an EP. It can also be derogatory, and is frequently used in that way. No evidence is supplied by the survey which can justify its use. It is not the sort of word expected in an academic paper, which is what Curtice intends his paper to be. I suspect that the fact that Curtice puts it in inverted commas might indicate he himself was aware he was exceeding his professional brief, though possibly he couldn't resist it. So it might be said to tell us something more about Curtice himself and his attitude towards an EP and its supporters. It is typical of how very many opponents express themselves when they speak about an EP. In a word, the use of the word constitutes a serious departure from the requirements of academic rigour. For that reason I would propose to NatCen that they have the word withdrawn, even if it means re-issuing the paper. I would even recommend the same to the publisher, IPPR. I am aware that the IPPR was founded as a New Labour think-tank in 1988 with the purpose of restoring Labour fortunes after losing three consecutive elections and that opposition to an EP is declared Labour policy. However in its blurb about itself in the foreword to this publication the 1PPR claims to have 'a truly world-class reputation for high quality research'. The issue of an English Parliament is first and foremost one of justice and equality within the United Kingdom. To represent its supporters as 'nationalist' is a subjective, not an objective, statement.

b. Curtice: 'On this evidence it would seem the idea of an English Parliament is capable of appealing well beyond the ranks of those who might be regarded as 'English nationalist'' (p.ibid).

My comment on this is that if Curtice were more familiar with the Campaign for an English Parliament and not, as it would appear, indulging somewhat unprofessionally in subjectivity, he would know that support for an EP has never been limited to people he calls 'English nationalists'.

c. Curtice: 'the idea of an English Parliament may be becoming linked a little more to adherence to an English national identity' (ibid).

We welcome this. The two fertilise each other.

3. Finance

The BSA survey found that since 2000 there has been a 20% increase (from 22.5%) to 42.5%) in people in England regarding Scotland's share of UK government spending is 'more than fair'.

Curtice comments:

'Having an English Parliament may be beginning to be regarded as a means of defending England's interests within the Union' (p.7).

I would not disagree with this nor with most of the rest of his deductions from the survey's finding in this area. For example, his statement that 'dissatisfaction with the status quo and support for the idea of an English Parliament have become more closely linked with feelings of discontent with Scotland's share of public spending' (ibid) is the case by and large. There is in the CEP membership a strong sense of the inequality and injustice that has been created by the form the 1998 devolution legislation took between the three nations of this island in relation to the Union Parliament and to each other. The 1997 government, led energetically by Scottish MPs, many of whom belonged to the Scottish Constitutional Committee and who had signed the March 1989 Scottish Claim of Right, committing themselves 'to making the interests of Scotland paramount in everything' they did, Gordon Brown being one of them, obtained a degree of self-rule for Scotland and other immense advantages which was denied in part to Wales and totally to England. It gravely unbalanced the Union. They displayed no misgivings about it at all. The representatives of Scotland in the Union Parliament achieved a most advantageous settlement for their country. However, it is that that has offended the strong sense of injustice and inequality I have mentioned among CEP members. It is a sense of injustice that should be shared by all people of a genuinely democratic perspective. It has also been very considerably increased by the growing understanding of how the Barnett Formula and the Block Grant work. However, so far most regrettably it has not yet been in evidence in the political parties, in academia inclusive of think-tanks and in the UK Establishment generally. Political party members are concerned to protect their individual interests first and foremost, as are political parties. Within academia hostility to England as a nation with its own identity and culture is endemic and is the product of decades of ideology.

II. My more general observations.

The findings of this survey are more than welcome to members of the Campaign for an English Parliament, and that in two ways. Firstly, they see that the attitude of the people of England on devolution as a requirement for England and in support of it taking the form of an English Parliament is now decisively moving in their direction. Secondly, it is now only a matter of time that the English Establishment, in academia and think-tanks, the media, and politics, will reflect critically upon their attitude to date of opposition to an English Parliament, will begin to harbour misgivings about their attitudes, and will at the very least begin to give the idea serious consideration and possibly even lend support. If it is not altogether undiplomatic to say it, people prefer to back winners. If there is one trend noticeable in the BSA survey on this matter, it is the movement of the English people in the direction of an English Parliament. MPs and political parties, very sensitive to voting developments, will quickly take on board the percentage of support for an EP which the BSA has found among people. We could hardly ask for more.

The CEP met with the most irrational, even disreputable, opposition when it first made its appearance in 1998 and certainly up to the North East referendum in 2004. The idea of an English Parliament was just written off. It was variously described as racist, xenophobic, nationalistic, pro-Tory, exclusive, and anti-Union. Undoubtedly the most outrageous, biased and unfair example of this was the Fabian Society publication 'The English Quesition' 2000, edited by Tony Wright MP and Selina Chen. I would refer people particularly to pages 12-13. To stand up in certain circles and propose an EP was at times very difficult indeed. Our arguments were just not listened to or read and frequently we were smeared, even to our faces, as racists. It is an amazing situation. A parliament for Scotland is universally regarded as a very good thing. Scottish and Welsh patriotism is regarded as a very good thing. A parliament for England is greeted however very differently.

Fortunately we stuck to our guns. We made it clear that the GLA was not a form of devolution in England but yet just another re-organisation of English local government. We opposed regional assemblies, particularly out on the streets in the North of England and in Newcastle, Durham and Sunderland, pointing out they amounted to the same thing as the GLA in the form they took for the 2004 referendum; and that in the purpose of their more ideological supporters they were intended to spearhead a process of the balkanisation of England. We opposed the Conservative Party policy of English Votes on English Laws with a booklet distributed to every member of the Commons and the Lords; and we oppose it still even in the watered-down form it might take if the Tories form the next government. We certainly welcome EVEL as what will be the first constitutional recognition since 1707 of England as a distinct political and national entity, which recognition was explicit for Scotland and Wales in the 1998 devolution legislation. However, it is not devolution as provided to Scotland and in part to Wales in the legislation of 1998. Itt does not even approach what Scotland got in 1998, namely the institution of self-rule on the basis of nationality, the establishment of a legislature physically, electorally and operationally distinct from the Union Parliament, and the establishment of an Executive. However, we welcome EVEL as a first step towards the formal constitutional recognition of England as a distinct nation.

There is a 10% increase in people in England identifying themselves as English, up to 41% of England population. There is an 11% increase in support for an EP, as many as 29% of the population. Indeed, as much as 34% of the English who regard being English as their identity. This increase is not confined to those whom Curtice calls, unscientifically, 'English nationalists' but extends to English people who regard themselves first as British. In other words the issue of fairness and justice for England, denied in the 1998 legislation, is now firmly on the Union agenda. There is a growing link between increasing support for an EP and the notion of adherence to an English identity, precisely, I would add, as it manifested itself, mutandis mutatis, in Scotland in the 1997 referendum. We welcome all this intensely. The tide is turning.

Nothing will solidify the basis of support for an EP like both the notion of English identity and the identification of the issue as one of fairness, equality and justice. It is for that reason we unhesitatingly welcome the increasing awareness of the English people of the financial advantages Scotland has obtained first through the Barnett Formula and then through the Scottish Parliament and its block grant, with the astonishing beneficence that has ensued. However, there is no desire on our part for a withdrawal of the subsidies to Scotland. Rather we want the same expenditure for the people of England. In a union of nations, if the union is to make sense and continue to have justification to exist, that is basic. Nothing threatens the continuation of the Union as much as the political, constitutional and economic injustice to England as the devolution legislation of 1998. Brown and co in 1998 thought only of Scotland. However, each component nation of the Union should stand in the same relationship to the centre and to each other.

The CEP welcome the outcomes of this survey. We recognise that there is an immense work to be done on the crucial issue of English identity; likewise we are all too aware that a 29% support for an EP, if it a reliable figure, is in no way good enough. I say 'if it is a reliable figure' because its findings do not accord at all with the findings of other equally reputable polling organizations. They are as follows: July 2006 Ipsos Mori for the Observer, support for an EP at 26%, but when those polled were informed of Scottish and Welsh MPs voting on English-only issues, support rose to 41%; November 2006 ICM for the Sunday Telegraph, 68%; and January 2007 BBC poll at 61%.

However, whatever the situation, and we are very aware the BSA poll did not put the alternative of EVEL to the people it polled, we know that these percentages have been achieved in the face of total government opposition and the policy on both of the Labour Party and the Lib-Dem Party of support for the balkanisation of England into regions with their own assembly, a policy Will Hutton perceptively described as 'a veritable witches' brew of internecine rivalries. We have operated on a shoestring; we have never had anything like the huge financial support enjoyed by such organizations as the Constitution Unit or the Power Inquiry or the Campaign for English Regions which have displayed systemic opposition to an English Parliament as the form English devolution might take.

Yet we have done very well indeed. I think our strength has been the strength and the logic of our arguments, contained in our innumerable articles and letters appearing in newspapers and periodicals, our presence at meetings to put the case for an EP, our meetings in the rooms of the Commons where we held public meetings and where we have given evidence before select committees, the three booklets we have written and published, and distributed widely, particularly to where and to whom it matters like MPs, our leafleting across the country, from Berwick to Cornwall, from Dover the Carlisle, from the Wash to the Wirral. Even as I write this, we have a 'battlebus', on the road with banners and huge posters, touring every major town throughout England.

We are greatly heartened by the BSA findings; and we welcome what on the whole is the very positive response of Professor Curtice. I am sure he can take criticisms kindly. We know all too well how immense are the obstacles to achieving an English Parliament. Getting one for Scotland was chicken feed in comparison to the task we face. However, the tide would appear to be turning.

Michael Knowles, National Council member of the CEP.

The Institute for Public Policy Research has released "Is An English Backlash Emerging? Reactions to devolution ten years on" which brings us details of the latest British Social Attitudes data on constitutional preferences for England.

Support for an English parliament has leapt from 17% in 2007 to a historic high of 29% in 2009.

The 2008 data should have been included in the 26th British Social Attitudes Report released in January 2010, but it was decided to hold back the data until now to publish the 2008 and 2009 data together as part of the IPPR's investigation into the English Question. So what we have here is a two year leap from when I covered the 25th British Social Attitudes report last year, when I suggested strongly that there would be a rise in support for an English Parliament.

The data for the 26th BSA report will have already been collected over the course of 2008; the year in which a Scottish prime minister was crowned, then bottled a general election, and in which his reputation and economic legacy were laid to waste. In 2008 we had an SNP Government, the SNP's National Conversation and the Calman Commission, not to mention the repeated criticism of the Barnett Formula.

Obviously I still have the same doubts about the methodology of John Curtice. I think the question is worded in such a way as to force English respondents to choose between Westminster - the traditional home of English governance - and a *new* English parliament. There is also no option to measure support for English Votes on English Laws, which is usually the most popular solution (although given that EVoEL is an answer to the British Question rather than the English Question I can understand why it was left out).

So the British Social Attitudes survey is flawed because it asks the public to choose between a *new* parliament for England or the UK parliament, which historically is the English parliament, and finds that only 29% would like a *new* English parliament.

It does not attempt to measure support for an English parliament at Westminster or a "parliament within a parliament" - an English Grand Committee or "English Votes on English Laws", the latter being the model that commercial polls find most support for.

Asking people to choose between Westminster (England’s traditional parliament) or a new English parliament presupposes that an English parliament must be new and/or distinct (ie not dual purpose).

It would be more useful to paraphrase the referendum that prompted the Scots to vote for a Scottish parliament in 1997:

1. I agree that there should be a English Parliament; or
2. I do not agree that there should be a English Parliament Parliament

Despite my reservations about the neutrality of the question that John Curtice uses to determine support for an English parliament, it is highly significant and encouraging that support for a new English parliament has risen to 29%. Commercial polls tend to show greater support for an English parliament, up to 67%, but it is the British Social Attitudes data that academics and politicians use as their measure of public opinion. In the past we have been treated to the following gems:

"Opinion polls show that an English parliament commands almost no support amongst the English people"
Prof Robert Hazell , Prospect Magazine, Feb 2006

"as we know, there is no demand for an English Parliament"
Lord Howarth of Newport , Hansard, 10 February 2006

"The English seem uninterested in a separate English Parliament, and not sufficiently interested to vote for English Votes on English laws."
Prof Robert Hazell, The English Question (2005)

"...there is no demand at all for devolution to England or the English MPs only being able to vote on English issues."
Lord Falconer, Today Programme, 10th March 2006

"there is little enthusiasm for an English Parliament, with support for such a body continuing at under 20%. So the idea of an English Parliament, we say: not today, not tomorrow, not in any kind of future we can see know."
Lord Falconer, Speech to the ESRC Devolution and Constitutional Change Programme, March 2006

"an English Parliament lacks popular support. Of course we can't be sure this will remain the case, but polls since devolution have shown very small levels of support (16 per cent) for this policy among the English."
Guy Lodge and Meg Russell, Scotsman, 18 Jan 2006

In light of this new data, the above rhetoric from people opposed to the creation of an English parliament will now be more difficult to sustain in the court of academic and political opinion. Public opinion will continue to be better reflected in the surveys of respected pollsters like ICM, Ipsos MORI and YouGov. Prof John Curtice concludes:

Support for the idea of an English Parliament may be beginning to find some roots in English national identity and perceptions of England’s material interests. If this trend continues too, then politicians may indeed no longer be able to assume that it is safe to ignore England in the devolution debate.

It is the upward trend that will worry politicians (and certain biased academics). Gordon Brown may yet be able to add rising support for an English parliament to his legacy list.

The full IPPR report is available for download here and the accompanying press relase can be read here.

Related: Response to Prof John Curtice

Over at Our Kingdom Guy Lodge has responded to my piece on John Curtice's IPPR report (one half of a pincer movement - see criticism of the CEP at Comment is Free).

Last year I contacted Guy Lodge to explain this statement he made in the Parliamentary Monitor Magazine (July, 2007):

A fully fledged English Parliament must also be rejected. Such a body would create an incredibly lop-sided federation, as England contains over 80 per cent of the UK’s population and wealth. This would be a route to instability.

Specifically I asked: On what do you base the claim that an English parliament would create instability; have you done any research into this; is there a precedent for such an unbalanced federation in a mature and stable democracy such as the UK?

Guy responded, "I think there are historic examples you can cite, notably Prussia," and continued:

an English Parliament would leave very little for a UK federal government to get its teeth in to. V quickly, I suspect, people within England would begin to ask what is the point of continuing with the Union when it slows down decision-making on fiscal policy, on immigration and defence etc. For this reason an English Parliament would destablise the Union. This might not concern you and others in the campaign who seem uninterested in preserving the Union, a view I respect, but disagree with. I actually think that CEP would be more credible if it was more honest about its position on the Union.

The worry for a great many of these Fabian/IPPR types is that an England for-itself would destabalise the Union: English political nationalism is the threat. It is not Englishness but English self-interest that is the destabalising factor, as I wrote in my review of Michael Kenny's IPPR report:

Devolution recognised three nations of the multi-national UK state, it gave institutional political recognition to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, it reinforced the distinctness of those nations whilst simultaneously confirming the in-distinctness of England. England is Britain is England; an absorptive patria to which the Scots, Welsh and Irish belong, and in which they will have their say. Unionism for the three nations is now on an in-and-for-themselves basis; for themselves in their own national assemblies; in Westminster as part of greater England. By contrast England is not for-itself. For England unionism is absolute, England remains in-itself; absolutely, resolutely in Britain.

And that's just how they want it. The authors' wish to confine English nationalism to purely cultural terms, to deny a for-itself political expression of Englishness, stems from their idea that a politically assertive England would undermine the multi-national solidarity of the United Kingdom. That multi-national solidarity rested on a contract between the peoples of the UK, a contract that was renegotiated by the devolution referendums and, crucially, renegotiated without input from the people of England. The fear now is that any real or imagined grievances that follow from the asymmetric settlement will lead to an English renegotiation on English terms, for-themselves.

What people like Guy Lodge object to is English self-government. They don’t want an England for-itself like Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are for-themselves. Fundamentally their view rests upon discrimination against England as a nation. Hence Guy's response is entitled "Time for a review of English governance" and not "Time for English Self-Government" - England cannot be self-acting and must therefore be denied self-government. England must be self-less.

In Guy's world England must sacrifice itself for the benefit of the whole, a sacrificial lamb at the alter of Unionism. If that’s what it comes down to then I’d rather sacrifice the Union.

The English, we are told, are a pragmatic people who have long resisted radical constitutional upheaval and the need for a codified constitution, preferring instead a process of adaptive and conservative progression. That is at least the charge, and a source of considerable national pride in some quarters.

If this is indeed the case then I believe that the British Social Attitudes Survey on English attitudes to devolution poses a leading question (or offers leading answers).

The survey asks: With all the changes going on in the way different parts of Great Britain are run, which of the following do you think would be best for England?

To which there are three available responses:

England should be governed as it is now with laws made by the UK parliament

Each region of England should have its own regional assembly that runs services like health

England as a whole should have its own new parliament with law-making powers

The BSA asks the English to choose between a new parliament or the UK parliament, which historically is the English parliament, and finds that only 22% would like a new English parliament. My review on Our Kingdom labours the point that many polls have found that a considerable number of English people would like an English Parliament that operates within the current framework of the UK parliament (eg English Votes on English Laws). This is a conservative, and [C]onservative, solution that is alleged to be a pragmatic response to devolution to Scotland and Wales.

Asking people to choose between Westminster (England's traditional parliament) or a new English parliament presupposes that an English parliament must be new and/or distinct (ie not dual purpose).

Also, the BSA do not make it absolutely clear that any 'new English parliament' would be a devolved parliament that is subordinate to Westminster (like the Scottish Parliament), if that is indeed the option that they intended to measure support for. They do not specify what law-making powers it should have, that they leave open to interpretation.

For all the respondents know they are voting for a federation.

Unfortunately it is the BSA figures that the self-anointed foremost authorities (people like Lord Falconer, Prof Hazell and Prof Bogdanor) reference when they dismiss calls for an English parliament. They are arrogant and mistaken.

The British Social Attitudes survey should not be used as a benchmark of public opinion because the methodology is flawed. I urge you all to point this out on every occasion that the powers that be blithely dismiss the option of an English parliament by citing a lack of public support. Pragmatic we may be, stupid we are not.

You should also bear in mind that the BSA results were collated in 2006, so they are out of date and pre-date the coming to office of a Scottish Prime Minister and an SNP administration. Not to mention the current conflagration over the Barnett Formula.

Review of Where Stands the Union now? Lessons from the 2007 Scottish Parliament election by John Curtice, ippr.

(ippr, February 2008, 13pp)

New ippr report's use of polling data underplays Scottish and English dissatisfaction with the current Union settlement.

To begin Professor Curtice looks at Scotland's position in the Union, and he casts a critical eye over commercial polls that indicate significant support for independence. What is understood by 'independence' is crucial and he suggests that for many respondents 'independence' means greater autonomy within the Union, rather than separation.

This ambiguity is highlighted by a comparison between ICM's results (which show strong support for independence) and YouGov (whose results show weaker support). The ICM survey asks simply whether Scotland should, or should not, become an independent country, whereas the YouGov survey asks Scots to choose between retaining the present Scottish Parliament or becoming a completely separate state outside the UK.

Prof Curtice suggests why the YouGov poll showed much lower support for independence:

Some respondents might have been misled into thinking that Scotland would lose its existing parliament if the country were to leave the UK.

Turning his attention to English public opinion Prof Curtice casts doubt over the commercial polls that show support for an English parliament. Instead he gives preference to the British Social Attitudes (BSA) results which, according to Curtice, show that "every time the question has been asked, more than half have opted to leave things as they are now". A quick glance at the table does appear to back his assertion up.

And here, unfortunately, and perhaps through no fault of his own, Prof Curtice is complicit in propagating one of the great myths of British politics: That the English are content with the Status Quo.

In the accompanying IPPR paper (Kenny et. al.) it was stated that "there is evidence to suggest that in terms of public endorsement for available constitutional options, the status quo has been the most popular choice of the English". There is not.

A look at the commercial polls shows that the English are clearly not content with the Status Quo. In fact the commercial polls suggest that a large proportion of those apparently in favour of the Status Quo would actually, if given the choice, favour English Votes on English Laws. This is the solution that Curtice's academic peers describe as “an English Parliament in all but name” , “a de facto English Parliament”, a "parliament within a parliament" or the “slippery slope to" an English Parliament. Every single poll, except the BSA one preferred by Prof Curtice, shows a clear preference for some form of English parliament, be it a devolved parliament, a parliament within a parliament, outright independence, or a combination of the three.

To paraphrase Prof Curtice, the ‘wording is crucial’. The BSA question forces the English to make a choice between a *new* parliament for England, or Westminster (the place of English government since the 12thC). If the Scots were "misled" into thinking that Scotland would lose its existing parliament by the YouGov poll, then the BSA wording is misleading the English into believing that an English parliament has to be *new*.

In fairness to Prof Curtice he does not doubt that the English want a resolution to the democratic asymmetry that results in the West Lothian Question (which serves to underline the fact that they are not content with the Status Quo). And he does point out that we should not assume that the English will not opt for procedural changes to Westminster to resolve the unfairness:

Perhaps people in England would like Scotland's public spending advantage reduced and its MPs debarred from voting on 'English' laws?

My own, albeit anecdotal evidence, acquired from five years living in post-devolution Scotland, backs up Curtice's conclusion that the Scots would be happy with more devolution. Go to the pub and ask a Scot what he would prefer, and more likely than not he will cry "Freedom"; there is a little bit of William Wallace in every Scot. But ask again in the cold light of day and more often than not it is greater autonomy that is preferred.

Just as the Scots respond emotionally to the notion of independence – even if they are not prepared to vote for the reality - the English have an emotional attachment to Westminster. The Houses of Parliament are an English icon, ranked third in our national iconography, and in 2002 the building itself topped a poll of the Seven Wonders of Britain. The ghost of Walter Bagehot occupies the place in the English collective psyche that Wallace occupies in Scotland's imagination. Prof Curtice uses the word 'relatively' as a qualifier to say that the English are "relatively uninterested in devolution". Relative to whom, or what? According to opinion polls the public are also relatively uninterested in the EU, but that's not to say that the EU does not affect prominent public concerns and should not be addressed. There is certainly support for an English aspect to government but it is hampered by fealty to Westminster and misinformation and confusion about the pragmatism and benefits of English Votes on English Laws (the English are yet to understand that an English parliament WILL require devolved English government).

On the election of an SNP government I agree that it should not be read as indicative of support for independence; instead it signifies the unpopularity of Labour and a change in the way politics is conducted in Scotland, it is also testament to the cult of Alex Salmond. However, devolution-max for Scotland combined with England and Wales' quest for equity will put intolerable strains on the Union. The Status Quo is not an option.

First published on Our Kingdom under the title Status Quo not an option: Gareth Young v ippr II.

Beyond the Constitution: Englishness in a post-devolved Britain (Kenny, English; Hayton) challenges the widely held presumption that the rise of Englishness necessarily signals the death-knell of the values and identities associated with Britishness and the legitimacy of the UK's polity. That a sense of Englishness is on the rise is not disputed, but what is disputed is the political salience of that rise in relation to the devolution settlement. Englishness it is argued, refreshingly, is not necessarily a malign force that will undermine Britishness.

Those familiar with The Politics of Englishness (Aughey: 2007) will experience a feeling of déjà vu because not only is the terrain the same, but so are the arguments traversed, and the conclusions drawn. Crucially:

There may be, therefore, a good case for a concerted re-evaluation of the relationship between Britishness and English identity, and a consideration of how a positive vision of Englishness can compliment, rather than threaten, a rejuvenated civic Britishness.

This is the crux: According to this paper Englishness does not require a political nationalism, nor the democratic and institutional trappings of nationhood recently acquired by it's partners in the United Kingdom, it can instead be sated and mollified by positive engagement with Britishness and a flowering of English cultural nationalism and self-awareness.

The authors cast doubt on the notion that recent greater English self-identification with England stems from any political resentment and financial grievances that have arisen as a consequence of devolution. Rather the phenomenon of increasing Englishness is a culturally-orientated wave of consciousness that began in the mid-1990s.

And it is noted that, in spite of English dissatisfaction, the Conservatives have resisted the temptation to play to the politics of English resentment (David Cameron's 'sour little Englanders' quote is referenced), preferring instead to leave that to: a few fringe groups, UKIP, and the far-right. No opinion is offered as to whether these fringe groups are the best vehicles for the articulation of English resentment but the authors do state that:

none of the parties displays any kind of confidence or willingness to bring Englishness into the heart of its strategic and policy thinking. Fearfulness and the hope that English nationalism will quietly subside have been the abiding watchwords of the political elite.

And though this may change the political parties as a whole do not envisage a scenario in which ‘English nationalism will mutate into a small-nation resentment at its position within a larger multi-national entity’. Put bluntly the authors do not envisage the English resorting to an Anglo-centric version of the little-Scotlander mentality, the political ramifications of which have disadvantaged England and precipitated the need for the very English renaissance called for. It is suggested that politicians have failed to engage with Englishness because engagement might signify a readiness to contemplate the next stages of constitutional reform in a manner that acknowledges England. Which presents something of a Catch-22 situation.

Quite what the English have to gain for themselves in forgoing a political nationalism is left unsaid, though it is suggested that the Union may be endangered and that Britishness is a more attractive national identity to liberals. And ethnic minorities. Britishness may be more accessible because it is the idea of a set of values, as opposed to substantive moral and cultural traditions; again, among liberals, rather than the population at large. What these British values are is unclear from this particular paper and a quote from Gordon Brown's Green Paper doesn't offer much help:

A large part of what we describe as Britishness traces back to our own civil war, its ultimate resolution the Declaration of Rights of 1689 and the Acts of Union. Our relative stability as a nation is reflected in a relative lack of precision about what we mean to be British.

The irony of the English points of reference is apparently lost on the authors. But they do suggest that the confidence of this statement of 'British history' could lead to a parallel discussion on a review of English governance. But having dismissed regionalism as taboo, and having warned against the populism of an English parliament or English Votes (they muse upon how the Government might build a bulwark against these seductive proposals) it is hard to understand what the authors are actually proposing, other than a nice poetic Englishness that can cosy up to a splendid civic Britishness. There is no discussion on the potential benefits of English citizenship and English civic nationalism.

Devolution recognised three nations of the multi-national UK state, it gave institutional political recognition to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, it reinforced the distinctness of those nations whilst simultaneously confirming the in-distinctness of England. England is Britain is England; an absorptive patria to which the Scots, Welsh and Irish belong, and in which they will have their say. Unionism for the three nations is now on an in-and-for-themselves basis; for themselves in their own national assemblies; in Westminster as part of greater England. By contrast England is not for-itself. For England unionism is absolute, England remains in-itself; absolutely, resolutely in Britain.

And that's just how they want it. The authors' wish to confine English nationalism to purely cultural terms, to deny a for-itself political expression of Englishness, stems from their idea that a politically assertive England would undermine the multi-national solidarity of the United Kingdom. That multi-national solidarity rested on a contract between the peoples of the UK, a contract that was renegotiated by the devolution referendums and, crucially, renegotiated without input from the people of England. The fear now is that any real or imagined grievances that follow from the asymmetric settlement will lead to an English renegotiation on English terms, for-themselves. As the authors point out it's English restraint, and lack of resentment, that may yet deliver the best from a botched job:

it is worth noting that for all its imperfections, the post-devolution constitutional position may have some merits, and prove more long-lasting than many assume, as the least-worst option currently available in constitutional and fiscal terms, in this debate.

Least worst for whom is left unsaid. For the English, or; for the nations whose existence as a 'national' people has been given democratic recognition, and whose existence as part of a 'multi-national' people - with undiminished representation in a unitary Union Parliament - rests on a magnanimous apolitical Englishness?

This passage from Politics of Englishness crystallises what the authors here are grappling with:

Devolution...has clearly modified the relationship between England and the other parts of the United Kingdom as a legal and political agreement and as a consequence the English question has become in large part England's British question. The question, in short, is to what extent this constitutional modification has undermined English patriotic identification with the United Kingdom.

The fix that the authors seek is not a constitutional fix to a constitutional problem, for them it is a problem best solved by English acquiescence in the face of the English-British dichotomy. A self-confident Englishness that is embellished by patriotic identification with the United Kingdom is what is needed. In fairness the authors do debunk the Kumar thesis that English identity is subsumed in Britishness – that the English have lost their Englishness and need to start from scratch. They must argue this, for to argue otherwise would oppose the very premise that they start from. English identity is strong enough, and; is more capable of being part of a multi-layered English-British identity than the jeremaids and cheerleaders for English nationalism would think; and secure enough to have just the British part of that multiple identity recognised constitutionally – it's a sacrifice the English must make while allowing the other UK nations to do the exact opposite.

In summary the authors, like the politicians, don't know what to do, and the only explanation as to why the English should not have a parliament of their own is a reiteration of Prof John Curtice's mistaken claims that the English are content with the Status Quo.

A shorter version of this article has been published by Open Democracy's Our Kingdom.